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OLD SOLUTIONS OF A NEW PROBLEM 
When King David said in his haste that all men are liars, was 
he led to acknowledge the hastiness of his remark through reflec-
tion on its logical consequences? If he were, he showed com-
mendable delicacy in taking for granted that we should see what 
the logicians insistently point out, that it must follow that he 
himself could not be believed. Reflection on this problem of 
verbal paradox has led some of the logicians, as well as the 
Psalmist, to wonder whether they have not made haste too 
rapidly. The paradox of the" Liar" is still with us; but modern 
writers, less hurried than David, usually state it in a form which 
leaves their own credibility beside the question and ponders only 
that of Epimenides the Cretan, our authority for the statement 
that all Cretans are liars. But with the most recent work in 
logic the comfort of so disinterested a position shows signs of 
forsaking us. Some of the solutions of this paradox begin to 
involve our right to make any statement about truth or logic and 
then claim that the statement itself is true or is logical. So Mr. 
Bertrand Russell would have us grant that no statement can con-
tain any reference to itself, and that when we wish to assert, 
"All propositions have subject and predicate" or "Truth is 
relative," then our statements themselves cannot be propositions 
or be truth within the meaning of their subjects; nothing has 
been said, he asserts, about the statements in which our thought 
is couched. 
The modern solutions of the "Liar" have been all offered by 
makers of logistic, the present custodians of formal logic, and 
quite properly so, since the difficulty with the paradox seems to 
be essentially formal. That it is a difficulty which is serious for 
the maker of an algebra of logic is shown by the size of the 
literature that it has occasioned and is still occasioning. 
In the recent attempts to solve the paradox several writers 
have mentioned that there was a scholastic discussion of the 
same problem which has left us many ingenious plans for its 
solution. That the scholastic solutions were, several of them, 
identical in principle with their modern successors is not so well-
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known. The solutions of Russell, Zermelo, Rftstow, Peirce, 
Poincare, Herbart, and Shearman, all bear a close resemblance to 
one or the other of the scholastic methods, whose interest for the 
general student is often much greater than the solutions that have 
been offered with a peculiar and intricate algebra of logic in 
mind. Nor was the paradox unfamiliar to the ancients. Mr. 
Alexander Rustow has collected a great number of references to 
it in ancient writers, chiefly Aristotle, Plato, and Diogenes 
Laertius-for it was of a sort calculated to attract the attention 
of Greek lovers of eristic. 
With the earlier writers the paradox was accepted as final and 
its speculative interest lay in the fact that unavoidable paradox 
could exist. Like Montaigne they asked what could be the value 
of a human reason that could find itself in such straits. Later 
writers were occupied in attempts to place the" Liar" among the 
Aristotelian fallacies which were supposed to care for all logical 
difficulties. There was no real statement of the difficulty, nor 
was there any attempt to solve the paradox formally. These 
came only with the more refined and formal logic of the scholastics. 
We are given to dismissing medirevallogic with little attention; 
and we are perhaps justified in so doing since a thorough study of 
the involved definitions and rules that were set up by logicians 
of that period would be impossible in the time allotted to the 
life of one man; even Prantl's monumental history amounts to 
little more than a collection of extracts under a limited number of 
headings-extracts not always representative of the views of the 
author quoted nor sufficient to present his theory. But this 
massive literature is only a reflection of the fact that the spirit 
for keen analysis and fine distinctions made the "Liar" an ideal 
subject for tests of the agility of the medireval mind. Between 
the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries each author of a logi-
cal text-book took his turn at the difficulty, and with a con-
fidence in his results that has gone out of fashion in our more 
sophisticated generation heralded a solution that should dispose 
of the matter for all time. 
It is uncertain when the name Insolubilia was first applied 
to these paradoxes. The first medireval mention of them in-
cludes other puzzles not of this type, having in common with 
this only the fact that they were difficult, puzzles like those of 
Plato's Euthydemus. Gradually only those paradoxes that had 
the peculiar and subtle difficulty of asserting their own falsity 
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were included. Typical sentences that are to be found in a 
number of lists are as follows: 
I. Ego dico falsum. 
2. Haec propositio est falsa. 
3. Ponatur, quod Socrates dicat illam, "Plato dicit fal-
sum, " et Plato dicat illam, "Socrates dicit verum. " 
4. Si Deus est, aliqua conditionalis est falsa, et sit nulla alia 
conditionalis. 
These are from the list compiled by Albertus de Saxonia in 
Vienna before 1390. The first of them, "Ego dico falsum," 
reduces to the type of the second, which is the most definite and 
satisfactory of all, "Haec propositio est falsa"; the last makes its 
own truth imply the falsity of a class of propositions to which it 
itself belongs, as does "All propositions are false." The re-
mainder of the long list either reduces to one of these two types 
or is intrigued by the use of terms whose meaning is not definite; 
as "Posito quod in mente Socratis sit ista, Socrates decipitur, et 
nulla alia, et Socrates credat illam esse veram, quaeritur, an Socra-
tes credendo eam esse veram, decipiatur" ; for in cases like this the 
discussion can lose its way in disagreement over the meaning of 
"to be deceived." Again, in "I lie" the word lie need not 
mean that every statement is false and so need not lead to para-
dox at all. The real difficulty was sometimes lost sight of or 
dismissed without comment. 
One of the earliest solutions was offered by Buridan, writing 
in the fourteenth century. In the Insolubilia, he holds, we have 
propositions that are both true and false, unavoidably so by 
logical rules. This is a contradiction of the law of excluded 
middle. He seems to see but one opening to reject the law. 
Perhaps further acquaintance with Buridan's work would show 
some attempt to supplement this seemingly ruthless method by 
showing how it would be possible to proceed without the law he 
discards; for Buridan knew and described a method offered by a 
contemporary, Hentisberus, that was more carefully planned. 
At the basis of this method is the doctrine of restrictio worked out 
in such detail by scholastic logic. Restriction means that the 
denotation of a term, which, as far as explicit statement goes, 
might betaken to be general, is often limited by the context-
an approximation to the more modern and less definite universe 
of discourse. In the case of the I nsolubilia this unexpressed 
restriction limits the denotation of a term in a proposition whose 
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verb is in the present tense to time immediately preceding the 
present instant; the instant when the sentence is begun, and not 
that in which it is uttered is the time represented by the verb. 
This is only an unusual way of stating something we are all apt 
to feel; namely, that no thought can really be "of itself"; before 
we comment on a situation there must be the situation to com-
ment on, the expression of any thought follows by appreciable 
interval the suggestion of that thought. This solution disposes 
of the paradox" I lie," since the statement cannot apply to itself 
because the statement is not made until after it is begun. And in 
a proposition like "This proposition is false" there is no state-
ment to which the sentence can refer. 
This same feeling that a proposition cannot refer to itself 
suggested another very similar theory-one that proceeded with-
out this reference to tense. Peter von Ailly wrote a tractate on 
the I nsolubilia in which he makes a distinction between mental 
and verbal propositions. Written and spoken propositions are 
not properly true or false; they are only symbols for mental 
propositions which alone have real meaning and truth. The 
I nsolubilia are all verbal propositions, he contended; and mental 
propositions cannot denote themselves. "Nulla propositio 
mentalis proprie dicta potest significare, se ipsam esse veram, nee 
potest habere reflexionem supra se ipsam. " We are given to 
understand that though the form of our words may seem to refer 
to itself, nevertheless the thought that leads to the expression 
never has that character, but always refers to some object in-
dependent of it. The rule for avoiding the paradoxes becomes, 
"Pars propositionis non potest supponere pro toto." This is not 
far from the most recent solution offered by mathematical logic, 
the principle of the vicious circle on which Russell's theory of 
types is based: "Whatever contains an apparent variable must 
not be one of the possible values of the variable." 
This method of solution was a favourite with other writers, 
Johannis Majoris Scotus, Olkot, and Rosetus among them. Its 
similarity to Russell's theory is curiously paralleled by identical 
criticisms, one in particular, directed at Paulus's theory by Wy-
cliffe, whose Logic is less known than his historical works. 
Wycliffe considers this rule that no proposition is to refer 
to'itself and finds that it leads immediately to difficulty. What 
shall we do about those general propositions, like" All proposi-
tions are true or false" and "All propositions have subject and 
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predicate," which pretend to refer to all propositions including 
themselves. Yet we may mean to say that even tre proposition 
we are using must be either true or false. The proposition" A is 
A" would no longer be the general statement that it pretends, for 
there would be one value of the" A" for which the proposition 
would assert nothing, namely the value" A is A. " Following this 
criticism our theologian offers as his own contribution a theory 
that is rather a disappointment after his acute criticism of the 
other view. The paradoxical statement, "This proposition is 
false, " he says, is neither true nor false in one sense of those terms, 
and so is no proposition at all. The criterion of truth in a prop-
osition is correct representation of a situation independent of the 
proposition itself, and where there is no such independent refer-
ence there can be neither truth nor falsity, and so there can be no 
proposition. He does not go on to consider the effect of this 
theory on the proposition, "All propositions are true or false," 
where there is both independent reference and self-reference; and 
after all, on a little reflection, his theory of independent reference 
amounts to the same thing as Peter's restrictio. 
Mansell's Aldrich offers a solution like the two just described. 
In the sentence, "Socrates speaks false," pronounced by Soc-
rates himself there is nothing to which the sentence can refer, so 
that it is absurd and says nothing; and besides, he says, the 
disputes over the I nsolubilia are great nonsense. " Nihilque 
opus est plura dicere de I nsolubilibus. " 
To the same class as these solutions there belongs one sug-
gested by the unknown author of a Paris manuscript which the 
writer terms cassatio. I He denies that the propositions in ques-
tion are propositions at all, but since he does not supplement 
this denial with a definition of proposition that excludes these 
questionable ones he offers only the beginning of a solution. 
All of these solutions are of the restrictive type and make their 
point by declaring that propo$itions cannot have reference to 
themselves as these pretend to have. They rule out the I n-
solubilia as illegitimate and meaningless statements. But there 
is another type, different from these in principle, and, like the 
theory of restriction, having its analogue in a modern theory. 
This is to be found in the solution of Paulus Venetus and a 
number of lesser writers. They decide that we may assume that 
every proposition asserts its own truth, and that in addition 
I Prantl, vol. 4, p. 41. 
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propositions in question assert also their own falsity. "Hoc est 
jalsum significat quod hoc est jalsum et quod hoc est verum, sed quod 
hoc sit jalsum et hoc sit verum est impossibile simpliciter." Such 
solutions do not resolve the paradox, exactly, but they place it 
in a class of false propositions on a par with" This pen has weight 
and has not weight"; the Insolubilia are shown, not only to imply 
contradictories, and hence to be paradoxical, but also to assert 
contradictories, and so to be merely false. 
These represent the more noteworthy methods of subjecting 
the Insolubilia to logical rule. Other methods were attempted; 
but these were of rhetorical rather than logical character, like 
Cranston's contention that no proposition really falsifies itself 
when the contrary can be rationally maintained. 
With the close of the scholastic period interest in the In-
solubilia died out almost entirely. Stray references to the para-
doxes contain only expressions of wonder that men could ever 
have been so misled by fondness for dispute as to split hairs on 
so vain a subject. Even formal logic neglected, and, in more 
modern times, the writers of logics not so formal despised, the 
problem-dismissing it as easily as Lotze, for instance, who said 
that there was no real difficulty involved when the speaker could 
change his statement to "I lied" instead of "I lie" and all para-
dox would be avoided. It was not until the rigorous formulation 
of modern mathematical logic forced them upon the notice of 
logicians that the I nsolubilia were again recognised as significant. 
And they are significant; for their problem, the problem of prop-
ositions whose denial involves their assertion, is identical with 
the problem of the ontological proof of the existence of God. In 
the upshot it is the problem not only of the limits of rational 
discourse, but of the limits of rational thinking. Whether the 
judgment that "There is no truth in us" can itself be a truth in 
us, is a question to be determined by a close definition of truth 
in terms of proposition and assertion. That II this proposition is 
false" can be the substance of "this proposition" is a matter for 
strict definition of "this, " and if there remains a paradox, that is, 
if the proposition then has contradictory results, the cure is to 
be sought in an amended definition, for the one that resulted in 
contradictories will be found to contain contradiction in its own 
statement. 
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